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Abstract
In this work a new multisecret sharing scheme for secret color images
among a set of users is proposed. The protocol allows each participant
in the scheme to share a secret color image with the rest of participants
in such a way that all of them can recover all the secret color images
only if the whole set of participants pools their shadows. The proposed
scheme is based on the use of bidimensional reversible cellular automata
with memory. The security of the scheme is studied and it is proved that
the protocol is ideal and perfect and that it resists the most important
statistical attacks.
Keywords. Secret sharing; Color images; Cryptography; Cellular Automata;
Image Processing.
1 Introduction
Secret sharing schemes were independently introduced by Shamir ([26]) and
Blakley ([4]) in 1979. These schemes are cryptographic procedures to share
a secret among a set of participants in such a way that only some qualified
subsets of these participants can recover the secret. The original motivation for
such schemes was to safeguard cryptographic keys from loss. Currently, they
have many applications in different areas such as access control, opening safety
deposit boxes, etc.
∗Corresponding author
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The most extended secret sharing schemes are the (k, n)-threshold schemes.
For this class of schemes k and n are integer numbers, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and its
protocol is as follows: There exists a mutually trusted party (a dealer) which
computes n secret shares from an initial secret and later he distributes them to
the n participants in a secure way. The (k, n)-threshold scheme has to verify
two conditions: (1) any k, or more, participants can recover the original secret
by joining their shares, and (2) any group of k− 1 or less participants is unable
to recover the secret. The most extended (k, n)-threshold schemes are due
to Shamir, which is based on polynomial interpolation, and Blakley, which is
based on the intersection of affine hyperplanes. Recently, several cryptographic
protocols for (k, n)-threshold cryptography have been proposed in the literature
([9, 20, 32]).
A (k, n)-threshold scheme is called ideal if the size of every share is equal
to the size of the shared secret, and a (k, n)-threshold scheme is said perfect if
the knowledge of any k − 1 or fewer shares provides no information about the
original secret (for more information about these schemes see [23, 27, 28]).
The first (k, n)-threshold scheme proposed to share images is the visual cryp-
tography ([25]). This scheme is perfect but not ideal since the size of the shared
images is bigger than the original one. Moreover, the quality of the contrast of
the recovered secret images is degraded. Several modifications to this first pro-
posal have been made. For example, in [21] (k, n)-threshold visual secret sharing
(VSS) schemes were studied and the authors provided a new characterization
of the VSS schemes for which black pixels in a secret black and white image
are perfectly recovered as black pixels. Moreover, Chen et al. ([7]) proposed a
multiple-level VSS scheme (MLVSS) in order to avoid the loss of contrast ob-
tained in the recovered secret image. This scheme has the advantages that an
enhancement of contrast is obtained and there is no expansion of the image.
Other visual secret sharing schemes have been proposed: In [5] a method
for intellectual property protection of grey level images was presented; a secret
sharing scheme for 250 grey-level images which elaborates shares of smaller size
than the original image and based on Shamir scheme, was presented in [29]; a
scheme for color images by using additive cellular automata was published in [2].
However, in visual schemes, there is, in general, a great contrast loss between
the secret image and the recovered one.
A scheme for sharing several secrets and not only one secret is called a mul-
tisecret sharing scheme. In this case, there exits m ≥ 1 secrets, S1, . . . , Sm, to
be shared among a set of n participants. This type of cryptographic protocol is
very useful when several secrets must be protected by using no more information
than when only one secret must be protected, or when the size of the secret to
protect is so big that it must be broken into several parts.
In the last years several multisecret sharing schemes have been proposed.
Some of them are based on hash functions (see [15, 17, 18]), on Lagrange inter-
polation polynomials ([16, 36]) or in coding theory ([8]). Nevertheless, most of
them are schemes to share texts and there are only a few proposals for sharing
images. The proposal given in [19] was based on the RSA cryptosystem and the
threshold scheme by Shamir; whereas the scheme presented in [31] was based
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on visual cryptography. Moreover, secret sharing schemes with multi-users have
been proposed to be used in watermarking schemes ([33]). In this proposal, the
original watermark is split into two shares so that the first share is embedded
into the cover image in order to increase the security; whereas the second one
is used to generate several keys.
In this work, a new multisecret sharing scheme for color images is proposed.
The generation of the shares from the secret color images is based on bidi-
mensional reversible cellular automata with memory. As it is known, cellular
automata are discrete dynamical systems which simulate complex behaviors by
means of simple computational models. Cellular automata have been widely
used in cryptography ([3, 10, 12, 14, 22, 24, 34, 35]).
The rest of this work is organized as follows: In Section 2, the basic def-
initions about bidimensional cellular automata are recalled; in Section 3, the
multisecret sharing scheme based on reversible cellular automata with mem-
ory is presented. Some experimental results are shown in Section 4; the security
analysis of the scheme is carried out in Section 5; and the conclusions and future
work are included in Section 6.
2 Bidimensional cellular automata
Bidimensional cellular automata (CA) are discrete dynamical systems defined by
a 4-uplet (C, S, V, f). C is the cellular space formed by a finite two-dimensional
array of r× c identical objects called cells, where the (i, j)-th cell is denoted by
〈i, j〉 (see Table 1).
〈1, 1〉 〈1, 2〉 · · · 〈1, c〉
〈2, 1〉 〈2, 2〉 · · · 〈2, c〉
...
...
. . .
...
〈r, 1〉 〈r, 2〉 · · · 〈r, c〉
Table 1: Cellular space of a bidimensional cellular automata with r × c cells
At each discrete time step t, each cell 〈i, j〉 is endowed with a state, s(t)ij ,
belonging to a finite set S. In this work we will consider S = Z2 = {0, 1}.
The CA evolves deterministically in discrete time steps changing the states
of all cells according to a local transition function, f . The updated state of
the cell 〈i, j〉 depends on the states of a set of cells called its neighborhood
which is defined by means of a set V ⊂ Z × Z. This work deals with Moore
neighborhoods, that is, the neighbor cells of 〈i, j〉, Vij , are the eight nearest cells
around it and itself:
V = {(−1,−1) , (−1, 0) , (−1, 1) , (0,−1) , (0, 0) , (0, 1) , (1,−1) , (1, 0) , (1, 1)} ,
Vij = {〈i− 1, j − 1〉 , 〈i− 1, j〉 , 〈i− 1, j + 1〉 , 〈i, j − 1〉 , 〈i, j〉 , 〈i, j + 1〉 ,
〈i+ 1, j − 1〉 , 〈i+ 1, j〉 , 〈i+ 1, j + 1〉} .
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As a consequence,
s
(t+1)
ij = f
(
V
(t)
ij
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ c,
where V (t)ij stands for the set of states of the neighbor cells of 〈i, j〉 at time t.
The (r × c)-th order matrix
C(t) =

s
(t)
11 s
(t)
12 · · · s(t)1c
s
(t)
21 s
(t)
22 · · · s(t)2c
...
...
. . .
...
s
(t)
r1 s
(t)
r2 · · · s(t)rc

is the configuration at time t of the CA, and C(0) is its initial configuration.
Moreover, the sequence E(k) = {C(t)}0≤t≤k is called the evolution of order k of
the CA. Due to the fact that the number of cells of the CA is finite, boundary
conditions must be considered in order to assure the well-defined dynamics of
the cellular automaton. In this work periodic boundary conditions are taken: if
i ≡ u (mod r), and j ≡ v (mod c), then s(t)ij = s(t)uv .
Let C be the set of all possible configurations of the CA, then the global func-
tion of the CA is a linear transformation, Φ: C → C, that yields the configuration
at the next time step in the evolution of the CA, that is, C(t+1) = Φ
(
C(t)
)
. If Φ
is bijective then there exists another cellular automaton, called its inverse, with
global function Φ−1. When such inverse cellular automaton exists, the original
CA is called reversible and the backward evolution is possible ([30]).
A particular and very interesting type of bidimensional CA are linear CA
(LCA for short) whose evolution is given by means of a linear local transition
function, s(t+1)ij = f
(
V
(t)
ij
)
, such that:
f
(
V
(t)
ij
)
=
∑
α,β∈{−1,0,1}
λα,β s
(t)
i+α,j+β (mod 2)
=
(
λ−1,−1 s
(t)
i−1,j−1 + λ−1,0 s
(t)
i−1,j + λ−1,1 s
(t)
i−1,j+1
+ λ0,−1 s
(t)
i,j−1 + λ0,0 s
(t)
i,j + λ0,1 s
(t)
i,j+1
+λ1,−1 s
(t)
i+1,j−1 + λ1,0 s
(t)
i+1,j + λ1,1 s
(t)
i+1,j+1
)
(mod 2) , (1)
1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ c, and λα,β ∈ Z2. Note that the sequence of coeffi-
cients {λαβ : α, β ∈ {−1, 0, 1}} determines in a univocal manner the LCA. Con-
sequently, every one of these local transition functions can be defined by an
integer number called its rule number: ω, which is given by:
ω = λ−1,−128 + λ−1,027 + λ−1,126 + λ0,−125
+ λ0,024 + λ0,123 + λ1,−122 + λ1,021 + λ1,120, (2)
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with λαβ ∈ Z2. Note that as λαβ ∈ Z2, it takes two values, 0 or 1; and as ω has
9 addends then there are 29 = 512 possible rule numbers which goes from 0 to
511, each one of them defines a linear CA. The local transition function of the
LCA with rule number ω is denoted by fω.
The main feature of such cellular automata is that they can be interpreted in
terms of Linear Algebra (see, for example, [6]). As an example, in Figure 1 the
space-time diagram of the LCA defined by λαβ = 1 for every α, β ∈ {−1, 0, 1},
that is the LCA with rule number 511, is shown.
Figure 1: Space-time diagram of a linear CA
The standard paradigm for CA states the state of every cell at time t + 1
only depends on the state of its neighbor cells at time t. However, it is possible
to consider CA for which the state of every cell at time t + 1 also depends on
the states of its neighbor cells at times t − 1, t − 2, . . .. In this case the CA is
called memory cellular automata, MCA for short (see, for example, [1]). In this
work, we will consider k-th order linear MCA (LMCA) whose local transition
function takes the form s(t+1)ij = F
(
V
(t)
ij , . . . , V
(t−k+1)
ij
)
, such that:
F
(
V
(t)
ij , . . . , V
(t−k+1)
ij
)
=
(
fω1
(
V
(t)
ij
)
+ . . .+ fωk
(
V
(t−k+1)
ij
))
(mod 2) , (3)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ c, ω1, ω2, . . . , ωk ∈ [0, 511], and the computation
considers modulo 2 because the arithmetic is performed in Z2. Note that, in
order to compute the evolution of a LMCA it is necessary to know its k initial
configurations:
{
C(0), . . . , C(k−1)
}
. For example, if we consider the 3-th order
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LMCA defined by:
F
(
V
(t)
ij , V
(t−1)
ij , V
(t−2)
ij
)
=
(
f511
(
V
(t)
ij
)
+ f511
(
V
(t−1)
ij
)
+ f511
(
V
(t−2)
ij
))
(mod 2)
=
(
s
(t)
i−1,j−1 + s
(t)
i−1,j + s
(t)
i−1,j+1 + s
(t)
i,j−1 + s
(t)
i,j
+ s(t)i,j+1 + s
(t)
i+1,j−1 + s
(t)
i+1,j + s
(t)
i+1,j+1
)
(mod 2)
+
(
s
(t−1)
i−1,j−1 + s
(t−1)
i−1,j + s
(t−1)
i−1,j+1 + s
(t−1)
i,j−1 + s
(t)
i,j
+ s(t−1)i,j+1 + s
(t−1)
i+1,j−1 + s
(t−1)
i+1,j + s
(t−1)
i+1,j+1
)
(mod 2)
+
(
s
(t−2)
i−1,j−1 + s
(t−2)
i−1,j + s
(t−2)
i−1,j+1 + s
(t−2)
i,j−1 + s
(t−2)
i,j
+s(t−2)i,j+1 + s
(t−2)
i+1,j−1 + s
(t−2)
i+1,j + s
(t−2)
i+1,j+1
)
(mod 2) , (4)
then its space-time diagram is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Space-time diagram of a 3-th order LMCA
Note that it is very easy to construct a reversible LMCA: it is sufficient
to take fωk
(
V
(t−k+1)
ij
)
= s(t−k+1)ij in equation (3) (note that this is the local
transition function of the LCA with rule number 16). Consequently, the LMCA
defined by
F
(
V
(t)
ij , . . . , V
(t−k+1)
ij
)
=
(
fω1
(
V
(t)
ij
)
+ . . .+ fωk−1
(
V
(t−k+2)
ij
)
+ s(t−k+1)ij
)
(mod 2) , (5)
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is reversible and its inverse CA is another k-th order LMCA with the following
local transition function, s(t+1)ij = G
(
V
(t)
ij , . . . , V
(t−k+1)
ij
)
, where:
G
(
V
(t)
ij , . . . , V
(t−k+1)
ij
)
=
(
−fωk−1
(
V
(t)
ij
)
− . . .− fω1
(
V
(t−k+2)
ij
)
+ s(t−k+1)ij
)
(mod 2) . (6)
This type of cellular automata was introduced by Fredkin (see [13]). In Figure 3
the space-time diagram of the reversible MCA constructed starting from the
MCA of the last example, is shown.
Figure 3: Space-time diagram of a reversible 3-th order MCA
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the space-time diagramas (for time steps t =
0, 1, 2, . . . , 14) obtained from three CA which are related in some way. These
diagrams are similar, but they are obtained in a different way. The first diagram
corresponds to a LCA with rule number 511; whereas the other two diagrams
are space-time diagrams of two invertible CA. In fact, the second diagram is a
diagram of a 3-th order LMCA with rule numbers 511, 511, and 511, and the
last diagram is the space-time diagram of its inverse CA. This last diagram is
the diagram of a LCA with rule number 16.
3 The new multisecret sharing scheme
In this section we propose a new multisecret sharing scheme. The scheme is
a (n, n)-threshold scheme such that each participant P1, . . . , Pn shares a secret
color image, S1, . . . , Sn. All participants can recover all secret images if all of
them share their shares.
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Set Sm with m = 1, . . . , n the secret images to be shared, which are defined
by r × c pixels. It is possible that some secret images have different size and
different color palette. In this case white pixels are padded around the original
image to get the same size for all secret images (this way of padding the images
is secure due to the fact that a truly random sequence is used in the step 5 of
the setup phase), and we consider the biggest color palette used by the secret
images.
These images can be considered as one of the components of the initial
configuration of a (n+ 1)-th order LMCA of, at most, 24(r × c) cells, C(m), as
follows: It is well-known that the numeric value of the color of each pixel of an
image, for example Sm, can be encoded (via RGB) with b bits by means of a
palette of p = 2b colors, where b = 1, 8 or 24. Consequently each image can be
represented by means of a binary matrix of order b(r × c). This binary image
stands for the configuration of the cellular automata.
The multisecret sharing scheme is divided in the following three phases.
3.1 Setup phase
In this phase, the trusted party or dealer defines the LMCA of order n+ 1 and
its initial configuration as follows:
1. D receives from each of the n participants his secret color image and
pads them, with white pixels around each image, in order to obtain a set
of n images, Sm, m = 1, . . . , n, defined by the same number of pixels.
Moreover, in order to obtain the same color palette for all images, D
considers that each pixel is codified by b bits (b ∈ {1, 8, 24}), taking into
account the biggest color palette of all secret images.
2. D generates n random integer numbers ωm ∈ [0, 511], m = 1, . . . , n, in
order to define m local functions of n LCA, fωm .
3. D constructs the local transition function of the LMCA, of order n + 1,
s
(t+1)
ij = F
(
V
(t)
ij , . . . , V
(t−n)
ij
)
, which is similar to that given in equa-
tion (3):
F
(
V
(t)
ij , . . . , V
(t−n)
ij
)
=
(
n∑
m=1
fωm
(
V
(t−m+1)
ij
)
+ s(t−n)ij
)
(mod 2) . (7)
4. D defines n components of the initial configuration of LMCA: C(m) = Sm,
with m = 1, . . . , n, which are the n secret color images shared by the n
participants.
5. D generates a random color image, S0, with the same size and the same
color palette than the other images and considers S0 = C(0), in order to
complete the initial configuration of LMCA of order n+ 1. Note that the
security of the system relies on the use of a truly random generator to
generate S0.
8
3.2 Sharing phase
In this phase, D computes the shares to be distributed in a secure way to the n
participants as follows:
1. D generates at random an integer number l ≥ n+ 2.
2. D computes the evolution of order (l + n− 1) of the LMCA defined in the
setup phase:{
C(0), C(1), . . . , C(n), C(n+1), . . . , C(l−1), C(l), . . . , C(l+n−1)
}
.
Each configuration C(t), t > n, is a noise-like image which can be identified
as a shadow of an original image.
3. D distributes in a secure way a share, (m,ωm, Rm), m = 1, . . . , n, to each
participant P1, . . . , Pn. This share is composed by three elements: (1) the
order number of the participant, m, (2) its rule number, ωm, and (3) the
shadow Rm. The shadows Rm = C(l+m−1), m = 1, . . . , n, are the last n
configurations of the evolution of the LMCA.
4. D publishes the number l and the last component of the initial configura-
tion for the inverse CA, i.e, R0 = C(l−1) = C˜(n+1).
3.3 Recovering phase
In this phase, as the sharing scheme is a (n, n)-threshold scheme, all participants
have to share their shadows so that all of them can recover the n secret color
images.
1. Each participant shares his shadow with the rest of them. In this way, a (or
the same) dealer D receives the following data: (m,ωm, Rm), 1 ≤ m ≤ n,
and moreover, D knows l and R0 as they are public.
2. The dealer D computes the secret color images by considering the initial
configuration of the inverse CA of the original LMCA:
C˜(1) = Rn = C(l+n−1), . . . , C˜(n) = R1 = C(l), C˜(n+1) = R0 = C(l−1),
and by iterating l − 1 times the LMCA of order n + 1 given by the local
transition function, s(t+1)ij = G
(
V
(t)
ij , . . . , V
(t−n)
ij
)
, similar to that of the
expresion (6):
G
(
V
(t)
ij , . . . , V
(t−n)
ij
)
=
(
−
1∑
m=n
fωm
(
V
(t+m−n)
ij
)
+ s(t−n)ij
)
(mod 2) .
Then, D obtains the n secret color images:
C˜(l) = C(n) = Sn, C˜(l+1) = C(n−1) = Sn−1, . . . , C˜(n+l+1) = C(1) = S1.
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Note that l and R0 can be made public by the first dealer due to the fact
that knowing these values does not reduce the security of the scheme. Moreover,
to recover the secrets it is necessary that the (new) dealer knows those values.
In relation to the complexity and efficiency of the protocol, it is necessary
to determine the computations needed in each phase. In the setup phase, the
computations are reduced to generate n random integer numbers in the interval
[0, 511] and, at most, 24(r × c) random bits. It is obvious that the time for
these computations is negligible. Moreover, the computations for the sharing
and for the recovering phases are the same and they consist in obtaining l − 1
shadows in the evolution of the CA considered. Each new pixel of a shadow is
computed by adding, at most, 9 pixels with, at most, 24 bits each. Due to the
fact that each shadow has r× c pixels, the computation of all shadows requires
9(l − 1)(r × c) binary additions of numbers of 24 bits. Hence, the protocol is
reduced to compute a number of additions which depends, basically, on the size
of the secret images.
4 Experimental results
As an example, we present the experimental results of a multisecret sharing
scheme with n = 4 participants. The participants will share the secret color
images shown in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
The first secret color image is a black and white photo of 512× 512 of Lena.
The second image is a smaller secret of peppers with 236-grey level image of
256× 256 pixels, the third image is a color photo of 332× 504 pixels of Marilyn
with 8514 colors; and the fourth image is a color photo of a baboon of 512×512
pixels and with 230655 colors.
Figure 4: The first and second secret color images to be shared
In this case, the dealer, D, receives from the participants the n = 4 secret
images shown in Figures 4 and 5, and D proceeds with the setup phase.
First of all, D consider the following values: r = 512, c = 512, and p = 224,
in order to pad the four secret images (step 1). After that, D generates four
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Figure 5: The third and fourth secret color images to be shared
integer numbers, ωi, in the interval [0, 511]. In the present example, these values
are ω1 = 93, ω2 = 316, ω3 = 477, and ω4 = 398 (step 2).
From these values, D constructs the local transition function of the LMCA,
F , to be used in the protocol, from the four local transitions functions of LCA,
fωi . To do this, D considers that the coefficients λα,β defined in the equation (2)
determine whether the cell in the position (α, β) of the Moore neighborhood is
taken into account or not.
In fact, from the values of ωi, i = 1, . . . , 4, we have:
ω1 = 93 = 1 · 26 + 1 · 24 + 1 · 23 + 1 · 22 + 1,
ω2 = 316 = 1 · 28 + 1 · 25 + 1 · 24 + 1 · 23 + 1 · 22,
ω3 = 477 = 1 · 28 + 1 · 27 + 1 · 26 + 1 · 24 + 1 · 23 + 1 · 22 + 1,
ω4 = 398 = 1 · 28 + 1 · 27 + 1 · 23 + 1 · 22 + 1 · 21,
hence, the functions fωi of LCA are the following:
f93
(
V
(t)
ij
)
= s(t)−1,1 + s
(t)
0,0 + s
(t)
0,1 + s
(t)
1,−1 + s
(t)
1,1,
f316
(
V
(t−1)
ij
)
= s(t−1)−1,−1 + s
(t−1)
0,−1 + s
(t−1)
0,0 + s
(t−1)
0,1 + s
(t−1)
1,−1 ,
f477
(
V
(t−2)
ij
)
= s(t−2)−1,−1 + s
(t−2)
−1,0 + s
(t−2)
−1,1 + s
(t−2)
0,0 + s
(t−2)
0,1 + s
(t−2)
1,−1 + s
(t−2)
1,1 ,
f398
(
V
(t−3)
ij
)
= s(t−3)−1,−1 + s
(t−3)
−1,0 + s
(t−3)
0,1 + s
(t−3)
1,−1 + s
(t−3)
1,0 ,
These expressions mean that, for example, the local transition function f93,
only considers the states of the cells in the positions (−1, 1), (0, 0), (0, 1), (1,−1),
and (1, 1).
These local transition functions permit D to construct F , the local transition
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function of LMCA of order 5 = n+ 1, to be used in the protocol, as follows:
F
(
V
(t)
ij , V
(t−1)
ij , V
(t−2)
ij , V
(t−3)
ij , V
(t−4)
ij
)
=
(
f93
(
V
(t)
ij
)
+ f316
(
V
(t−1)
ij
)
+f477
(
V
(t−2)
ij
)
+ f398
(
V
(t−3)
ij
)
+ s(t−4)ij
)
(mod 2) .
To end this phase (steps 4 and 5), D generates a truly random image of size
512 × 512 and 224 colors and defines C(0) = “Random image”, C(1) = “Lena”,
C(2) = “Peppers”, C(3) = “Marilyn”, and C(4) = “Baboon” (see the first image
of Figure 6, and Figures 7 and 8).
In the sharing phase, D generates at random an integer number, l ≥ n+2 =
6, in this case, l = 10 (step 1) and computes the evolution of order l+n−1 = 13
of the LMCA defined in the setup phase (step 2). Figure 6 shows the random
image defined in the step 5 of the setup phase, C(0), and the next space-time
diagram following to the four secret images, that is, the configuration C(5) (we
do not include all the space-time diagrams of the evolution of the LMCA defined
in the protocol because the configurations C(6)-C(9) are of the same type, i.e.,
they are like random-noise images).
Figure 6: Configurations C(0) and C(5)
At the end of this step 2, D have obtained the four shadows to be distributed
amongst the four participants. Figures 7 and 8 show the shadows of the n = 4
participants.
To finish the sharing phase (steps 3 and 4), D distributes in a secure way
the following values to each participant:
P1 :
(
1, ω1 = 93, R1 = C(10)
)
,
P2 :
(
2, ω1 = 316, R2 = C(11)
)
,
P3 :
(
3, ω1 = 477, R3 = C(12)
)
,
P4 :
(
4, ω1 = 398, R4 = C(13)
)
,
and finally, D publishes the value l = 10 and the configuration R0 = C(9).
To recover the original secret images, the participants only have to join their
shares, consider the data made public for the dealer, i.e., l = 10, and R0 (step
12
1); and follow the step 2 of this phase, which is similar to the step 2 of the
sharing phase, but with different parameters. In fact, in this step, the LMCA
is defined by the configurations
C˜(1) = R4, C˜(2) = R3, C˜(3) = R2, C˜(4) = R1, C˜(5) = R0,
and by the local transition function G given by
G
(
V
(t)
ij , V
(t−1)
ij , V
(t−2)
ij , V
(t−3)
ij , V
(t−4)
ij
)
=
(
−f398
(
V
(t)
ij
)
− f477
(
V
(t−1)
ij
)
−f316
(
V
(t−2)
ij
)
− f93
(
V
(t−3)
ij
)
+ s(t−4)ij
)
(mod 2) .
The secret images recovered are shown in Figures 9 and 10 which are exactly
the same than the original ones considered by D after to pad them, that is, their
contents are the same, although their sizes and color palettes are not the same
in all cases.
Figure 7: Shadows of the first and second participants: C(10) and C(11)
Figure 8: Shadows of the third and fourth participants: C(12) and C(13)
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Figure 9: Secret color images recovered by the participants
Figure 10: Secret color images recovered by the participants
5 Security analysis
In this section we analyze the security of the proposed protocol. In particular,
we prove that the protocol is ideal-like and perfect, and it resists the most
important statistical attacks.
5.1 The sharing scheme is ideal-like and perfect
If the original secret color images are of different size or they are defined by
different color palettes, the scheme is not ideal in a strict sense, because there
is not ‘a size’ for all the secrets. In this case, the size of the shadows is equal to
the biggest secret image and the color palette is also the biggest of the images.
Nevertheless, if all secret images have the same size and the same color palette,
the scheme is ideal as the shadows are configurations of the same LMCA. Hence,
we can consider that the scheme is ideal-like.
Moreover, the scheme is also perfect due to the fact that if only one shadow
14
is unknown, say C˜(n−q) = C(l+q), for a q with 0 ≤ q ≤ n − 1, then there is no
information about the configuration C˜(n+2) = Cl−2, and hence for any other
C˜(n+p) = Cl−p, with 3 ≤ p ≤ l. This is because the evolution of the LMCA is
given by the following linear system:
s
(n+2)
ij =
(
uij + s
(n−q)
ij + vij
)
(mod 2) , 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ c− 1,
where uij and vij are values obtained from the known configurations; whereas
s
(n+2)
ij and s
(n−q)
ij are unknown values. In this situation, a system with r · c
equations with 2r · c unknowns is obtained which can not be solved. A harder
situation to be solved will be obtained if the number of unknown configurations
is greater than one.
5.2 Statistical analysis
We have carried out a statistical analysis by means of several statistical tests
in order to determine the security of the new multisecret sharing scheme. The
results allows us to state that it strongly resists the statistical attacks.
The first statistical test we have carried out is the set of tests stated by FIPS
([11, 23]) in order to ensure the randomness of a binary sequence of 20000 bits.
This set of test is formed by the following tests: Monobit, Poker, Runs, Long
runs, and Autocorrelation. We have implemented these tests in Matlab and all
the shadows shown in Figure 7 and 8 have passed these tests.
As it is well known, the linear complexity of a bit sequence s is defined as
the length of the shortest LFSR that generates the given sequence, and it is
denoted by L(s). If Li, i ≥ 1, is the linear complexity of the finite subsequence
si = s1, s2, . . . , si, of the sequence s, then the sequence L1, L2, . . . is called the
linear complexity profile of s. This sequence can be plotted by representing the
points (i, Li), i ≥ 1, and joining them by horizontal and vertical segments. It
is clear that the graph of a linear complexity profile is not decreasing and that
the expected linear complexity of a random sequence should closely follow the
line L = i/2. Here we have used the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm ([23, §6.2.3])
to determine the linear complexity of the finite sequences formed by the 10000
first bit of each shadow. In all cases, we have obtained a value of L(s) = 5000.
As an example, in Figure 11, the runs test and the linear complexity profile
of the share 1 are shown (see Figure 7).
The second statistical test tries to determine the confusion and diffusion
properties of the proposed scheme. This test is performed by a correlation test
of adjacent pixels of the original image and its shadows. The correlation test
between adjacent pixels in the images has been made selecting in a random way
1000 pairs of two vertically adjacent pixels, 1000 pairs of two horizontally adja-
cent pixels, and 1000 pairs of two diagonally adjacent pixels, for each original
image as well as for its shadows. In each case, the correlation coefficient of each
pair has been computed and the results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. From
these tables it is observed that the correlation coefficients of the images and the
shadows are different enough, which guarantees the confusion and diffusion of
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Figure 11: Runs test and Linear complexity profile of the shadow 1
the pixels. It is observed, in addition, that the correlations in the shadows are
very small indeed.
Image 1 Image 2 Image 3 Image 4
Horizontal −0.3546 0.9553 0.9654 0.9169
Vertical −0.0534 0.9704 0.9685 0.8683
Diagonal 0.2902 0.9191 0.9439 0.8497
Table 2: Correlation coefficients of adjacent pixels for the secret color images
Shadow 1 Shadow 2 Shadow 3 Shadow 4
Horizontal 0.0086 −0.0008 −0.0298 −0.0405
Vertical 0.0065 0.0104 −0.0057 0.0567
Diagonal −0.0103 0.0277 −0.0081 −0.0367
Table 3: Correlation coefficients of adjacent pixels for the shadows
Figure 12 and 13 show the correlation distribution of 1000 couples of hor-
izontal adjacent pixels of secret images and shadows, respectively. One can
observe how in the first case, the distributions follow, approximately, the prin-
cipal diagonal, which gives an idea of the strong correlation among the pixels
of the secret images; whereas in the second case, the clouds of points seem to
distribute in a random way, which indicates the week correlation among the
pixels of the shadows.
The third test has been designed in order to test the influence of one-pixel
change on the whole share. This test uses two measures: the number of pixels
change rate, NPCR, which measures the percentage of different pixel numbers
16
Figure 12: Correlation of horizontal adjacent pixels of the secret images
between two images; and the unified average changing intensity, UACI, which
measures the average intensity of differences between two images.
Suppose that R = Ct0 =
(
st0ij
)
and R˜ = C˜t0 =
(
s˜t0ij
)
are two shadows
obtained from original secrets that differ in only one-pixel. Define a bipolar
array of size r × c, D = (dij), such that dij = 0 if st0ij = s˜t0ij , and dij = 1
otherwise. The NPCR and UACI are defined as follows:
NPCR =
∑r
i=1
∑c
j=1 dij
r · c × 100%, (8)
UACI =
1
r · c
 r∑
i=1
c∑
j=1
| st0ij − s˜t0ij |
number of colors
× 100%, (9)
From the previous definition, a high value of NPCR and a high value of UACI
mean that the change of a pixel in the secret image influences significantly in
the shares. The range for NPCR is between 0-100 and in the present example
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Figure 13: Correlation of horizontal adjacent pixels of the shadows
these values are bigger than 99. For this reason, we can state that the proposed
scheme is very sensitive with respect to small changes in the secret images.
The results for the NPCR test and for the UACI test comparing the corre-
sponding pairs of shares are shown in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively.
6 Conclusions and Future work
In this work a new multisecret sharing scheme for color images has been pre-
sented. The scheme is developed by a (n, n)-threshold scheme and it is based on
bidimensional reversible cellular automata with memory. We have shown that
the scheme is ideal-like and perfect. Moreover, we have studied its statistical
properties and we have proved that the multisecret sharing scheme is secure
against statistical attacks.
Our future work consists of extending the previous multisecret sharing scheme
to more general (k, n)-threshold schemes, where k < n. Moreover, we will try
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Shadows Red Green Blue
0− 0 99.6040 99.5972 99.5975
1− 1 99.5975 99.6201 99.5808
2− 2 99.6025 99.6212 99.6269
3− 3 99.5964 99.5892 99.6136
4− 4 99.6162 99.6174 99.6132
Table 4: NPCR test comparing the corresponding pairs of shares
Shadows Red Green Blue
0− 0 33.4249 33.4396 33.4449
1− 1 33.5108 33.4930 33.4973
2− 2 33.3500 33.4339 33.4945
3− 3 33.4758 33.4463 33.4672
4− 4 33.5025 33.4019 33.3772
Table 5: UACI test comparing the corresponding pairs of shares
to define a new multisecret scheme in order to authenticate the dealer of the
protocol, for example, by adding a signature scheme.
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